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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
While some broadband providers have called Internet content and application providers 
free riders on their infrastructure, this is incorrect and misguided.  End-users pay for their 
residential broadband providers for access to the Internet, and content providers pay their own 
ISPs for connectivity as well.  However, content providers need not pay residential broadband 
providers’ ISPs in order to reach their customers.  This feature of the Internet has been one key 
factor that has allowed innovation to prosper and kept barriers to entry low, as the network 
transport market for content and application providers functions relatively efficiently. 
In this paper, I consider the impact of a departure from this current system.  I examine the 
possible impact of last-mile broadband providers’ imposing “termination fees” on third-party content 
providers or application providers to reach end-users.  Broadband providers would engage in paid 
prioritization arrangements – that is, application and content providers could pay the broadband 
provider to have their traffic prioritized over competitors’ services.  I argue that these arrangements 
would create inefficiency in the market and harm innovation.  Because the last mile access 
broadband market is concentrated and consumers face switching costs, these concerns are 
particularly significant. 
Broadband providers insist that imposing these new charges will greatly improve network 
investment, and thus these charges are beneficial.  I argue that this is not the case.  Possible 
higher revenues from discrimination may simply be returned to shareholders and not invested.  
Additionally, evidence suggests networks invest more under non-discrimination requirements, and 
paid prioritization schemes would divert money towards managing scarcity instead of expanding 
capacity.  Paid prioritization could even create an incentive for broadband providers to create 
congestion to increase the price of prioritized service. 
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1. Background 
1.1 The Open Internet and Innovation 
The Internet is so deeply embedded in people’s lives that it is all too easy to forget that its 
commercial life is approximately a mere fifteen years.  The Internet’s amazing and immediate 
benefits have been based on its openness, ubiquity, and non-discrimination.  This non-
discrimination – dubbed “network neutrality” – means that content from anyone and of any type is 
treated equally by broadband providers.  Its open and public standards and the fact that no one 
has had to ask permission from network operators to innovate have resulted in rapid innovation 
that contributed to one of the greatest periods of economic growth in history, unprecedented 
access to information, and fostered amazing creative interactions.1 
The Internet’s tremendous success has also been based on harnessing and benefiting 
from networks effects.  The Internet exhibits network effects because each user’s value from 
connecting to the Internet increases as more computers and users are added to the network.2 The 
value of a user’s experience depends on and increases with the amount of content and 
applications available on the Internet.  The value of content and applications on the Internet, in 
turn, increases with the number of users connected.  This creates a virtuous cycle that dramatically 
expands the value of the network as its size grows.  Because of these network effects, the value of 
the Internet to users and companies depends crucially on two factors: (i) the number of users that 
adopt (penetration); and (ii) the number of firms that create applications for the Internet or make 
content available on the Internet.  
In addition, in many economic environments, consumers and businesses benefit more 
from innovation and the resulting growth than from the static benefits of allocative and productive 
efficiency.  With respect to the Internet, the spillover benefits in this regard are very significant.3 
Dynamic efficiency requires creating conditions to promote the appropriate level of innovation 
leading to economic growth.  The Internet’s design allows businesses and consumers connecting 
to it (“at the edge” of the network) to innovate without obtaining approval from network operators.  
As a result, all innovation that is expected to yield benefits greater than its costs can occur; this is 
different than in a centrally controlled network where innovation at the edge would be restricted by 
the network operator based solely on whether the innovation brought profits to the network 
operator rather than whether the benefits of the innovation to the whole society exceeded its costs.  
This unleashes a huge potential for innovation.  
1.2 How Content Providers Already Pay for Network Transport 
This paper is going to focus on one particular facet of the Internet’s current structure, 
which is the current way that content and application providers obtain network transport such that 
they are accessible by end-users.  The fact that broadband providers only charge on one side of 
                                                            
1  For example, Czernich et al. (2009) find that a 10 percentage-point increase in broadband penetration raises annual 
per-capita growth by 0.9 - 1.5 percentage points.  Such increase in economic growth would add to U.S. GDP $1.5 to 
$2.5 trillion dollars in the ten-year period 2010-2020. 
2  See Economides (1996). 
3  See Hogendorn (2010) for a discussion of network and spillover effects on the Internet. 
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the market – to end-users – has helped protect the “innovation without permission” nature of the 
Internet and kept barriers to entry low. 
While some broadband providers have called content and application providers free 
riders,4 this is incorrect and misguided.  The Internet’s basic structure functions in the following 
way.  Users at the “edge” of the network each pay for their own connections.  That is, a residential 
end-user will pay a broadband ISP in order to access the Internet, and content providers will also 
pay an ISP in order to make their content available across the Internet.  Each ISP will pay an 
Internet Backbone Provider (IBP) in order to send traffic across the Internet.  The typical “transit” 
contract between an ISP and an IBP provides an ISP a pipe of a certain bandwidth through which it 
can access the whole Internet.  ISPs might also peer with other networks, in order to exchange 
data between them at no cost.5 Although the Internet is composed of a large number of 
interconnected networks, its market relationships are typically bilateral, specifically between an ISP 
and an IBP, between two IBPs, or between a business or residential customer and an ISP. 
While users and content providers each pay their own ISPs for connectivity, neither need 
pay other ISPs in order to reach their customers.  In order for me to communicate with my family 
members in California, I do not need to pay their ISPs; rather, I simply pay my own ISP in New 
York.  The same is true of content providers – they pay an ISP for network transport, but they do 
not have to pay the ISPs of Internet users in order to reach those users. 
In the market for last-mile services provided to end-users, there is significant concentration 
in the market as I discuss below and thus there are concerns about inefficient pricing there.  
However, across the rest of the Internet, the collection of bilateral market relationships for network 
transport works relatively efficiently today.  What an ISP pays to a backbone is a function of the 
value that it brings to the Internet and is determined through negotiations between the ISP and the 
backbone.  Since there are many IBPs with which an ISP can connect, the ISP can negotiate a 
price with them that reflects its value to them.  Similarly, the resulting price is a function of the value 
that the IBP brings to this ISP.  That is, the resulting price that an ISP pays to IBPs is market-
determined through negotiations between them.  Likewise, pricing for connection to the Internet by 
content and applications providers is determined through negotiations with ISPs.  For example, 
suppose that Comcast as a local ISP can bring very valuable customers from area X to the 
Internet.  It can and does negotiate its connection price with multiple IBPs, and the resulting 
price(s) reflects the value that Comcast’s customers bring to the Internet.  Suppose that also 
connected to one of these IBPs is Yahoo’s ISP which sends and receives information packets from 
Comcast’s customers.  Yahoo’s ISP also negotiates a price with this and other IBPs for transport 
service reflecting the value it brings to the Internet.  Throughout this series of market transactions, 
from ISP to IBP, from IBP to ISP, and from ISP to content or application provider, market prices are 
determined.  Because these prices are all market-determined and because there is significant 
                                                            
4  See, for example, the interview of Ed Whitacre, AT&T’s ex-CEO in BusinessWeek referring to the use by Google, 
MSN, Vonage, and others of AT&T’s Internet infrastructure:  “Now what they would like to do is use my pipes free, but I 
ain’t going to let them do that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return on it.”  BusinessWeek 
November 7, 2005. 
5  Under peering, two interconnecting networks agree not pay each other for carrying the traffic exchanged between 
them as long as the traffic originates and terminates in the two networks.  For a more detailed discussion, see 
Economides (2007), at p. 4. 
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competition among IBPs, they have worked well in aligning payments with value provided.  The 
market between ISPs and IBPs has been unregulated throughout the commercial life of the 
Internet and there is general consensus that it has worked well so far.6  
These current pricing arrangements are a feature, not a bug, of the Internet as we know it 
today.  As I will explain below, deviating from the status quo could have grave consequences. 
2. The Dangers of Broadband Providers Erecting New Tolls on the 
Internet 
Broadband providers have the ability to charge content and applications providers to allow 
them to reach end-users (“termination fees”).  They could also engage in paid prioritization 
arrangements -- that is, they could offer to prioritize a providers’ traffic so that it reaches end-users 
with a guaranteed higher relative quality (that is, faster relative speed or lower relative latency).  
Providers who pay a surcharge would receive this prioritized treatment, while others’ traffic would 
only be delivered on a best-efforts basis.7 These arrangements threaten innovation online and 
social welfare for a number of reasons.  For the purposes of this paper, I do not consider 
separately broadband provider’s prioritizing traffic without charge to third-parties, although many of 
the concerns I raise below would be equally applicable.  I will show below that last mile residential 
broadband providers have incentives to use discrimination to the detriment of the societal value of 
the Internet. 
2.1 Pricing Will Not Take into Account Network Effects and the Full Benefits of 
Innovation, Creating Inefficiency 
The existence of network effects and other spillovers means that the market will under-
supply innovation in content and applications, relative to the socially optimal level.  Because 
broadband providers do not internalize the value from network effects or other spillovers to 
consumers and society in general, their pricing decisions when charging content and application 
providers do not take its full societal impact into account.8 As such, we can expect these prices to 
be above the socially optimal level.  This, in turn, would reduce the value to users and would 
diminish adoption and the virtuous cycle of network effects and spillovers.9 Further, the market 
might also underprovision Internet content because it exhibits the characteristics of a public good, 
in that it can be consumed by one person without diminishing its value to anyone else and it may 
be hard or difficult to exclude people from using the good.  If we cannot subsidize innovation, a 
network access price close to cost to the content and applications side is the second best.  Content 
and application providers already pay for network transport at a cost that can be assumed to be 
near the incremental cost, since that price is set in a relatively well-functioning market.  Levying 
additional fees on these providers would mean that they would be paying significantly above the 
                                                            
6  See Economides (2005). 
7  Higher relative speed does not imply higher absolute speed since it can be achieved by slowing down other packets 
rather than speeding up the prioritized ones. 
8  See Hogendorn (2010). 
9  Additionally, many of the goods consumed on the Internet are information goods and therefore are public goods.  
Such goods can be consumed without being diminished and their contribution to consumer’s surplus may be 
significantly higher.  
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cost of network transport, which would reduce the amount and variety of content and applications 
produced, as well as innovation at the edge of the network and network effects. 
Some economists have modeled the proposed imposition of fees by broadband providers 
to content and applications providers on the other side of the market in a concentrated market.  In 
making this assessment, it is crucial to take into consideration at least four benefits to society from 
changes in pricing on the Internet: (i) the direct consumers’ surplus (difference between what 
consumers are willing to pay and what they actually pay); (ii) the profits of the networks; (iii) the 
profits of the content and applications companies that distribute or provide services through the 
Internet; and (iv) the benefits of innovation at the edge of the network.  Economides and Tag 
(2009) calculate the effects of broadband providers imposing fees on content and applications 
providers.  Without considering the effects on innovation, they find that introduction of such fees 
reduces total surplus (the sum of (i), (ii) and (iii) above).  Since such fees would also reduce 
innovation at the edge of the network, the results of this paper show that they will significantly 
reduce societal benefits from the Internet.  Yet a monopolist or duopolist broadband provider has 
an incentive to introduce such fees if left unfettered. 
2.2 Termination Fees and Paid Prioritization Undermine the Current Efficient 
Market for Network Transport and Introduce New Transaction Costs 
When supporting imposition of these fees, it is truly ironic that some broadband providers 
claim to be promoters of markets.  In fact, new tolls would allow broadband providers to bypass a 
well-functioning market and impose arbitrary contracts.  These sorts of fees would circumvent the 
existing Internet transport market and negate the efficiency all agree it provides.  
These fees threaten to increase dramatically transaction costs for creators of content on the 
Internet.  As Lee and Wu (2009) and Bauer (2007), among others, argue, it is important to 
recognize that there is a big difference between zero fees and small fees.  By having zero fees, 
one eliminates a great range of costs for content providers, since they need not inform themselves 
about how to reach end users, they need not contact and bargain with last-mile access providers 
and they need not pay any additional fees.  Introduction of new transaction costs can be 
particularly harmful for small businesses, for startups and for individual content providers 
maintaining blogs - the type of agents that have contributed so much to the explosion in content 
and innovation on the Internet during the last decade.10 
Further, if these fees are imposed, we will potentially see an exponential growth in demands 
by broadband providers to collect money from a large number of ISPs and from the much larger 
number of the ISPs’ individual customers.  Instead of the straightforward voluntary market 
transactions that we observe today, which developed over time and without regulatory intervention, 
we may see an explosion of attempts by broadband providers with market power to collect money 
from any one of a very large number of hosts on the Internet. 
                                                            
10  The effects of such fees are accentuated by the fact that content is an “experience good” which means that its value 
and features are hard to ascertain before consumption.  Imposing fees will make it more likely that it will be much 
harder for new content firms to reach consumers and to survive. 
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The explosion in pricing may also result in substantial and needless confusion, which 
would make providing content on the Internet much harder, would limit incentives to innovate, and 
reduce benefits of network effects.  In fact, the resulting confusion and disarray may lead to calls 
for new rate regulation in this arena, which may be far more intrusive than what the FCC has 
currently proposed.  There is a long history of regulating termination fees in the context of the 
telephone industry.  
2.3 Broadband Providers’ Are Vertically Integrated Entities.  Broadband 
Providers Have Unique Incentive to Disadvantage Competing Application 
and Content Providers, and Third-Party Charges Inherently Will Favor 
Broadband Providers’ Affiliated Services. 
Since the last-mile broadband providers also operate in the content and applications 
markets, there is no way for a single price/fee to all content providers, affiliated and unaffiliated, to 
be “non-discriminatory” in an economic sense.  Charges to the affiliated content division are merely 
accounting entries for the last-mile provider, and do not reflect a real additional cost to the 
company as a whole.  In contrast, the price impacts the unaffiliated provider’s decision making 
much differently as it must actually pay the price or fee.  For example, if the last-mile provider sets 
a price well above incremental cost, it will still base its decisions on the incremental cost 
(regardless of the internal transfer price) while an unaffiliated provider will base its decision on the 
price quoted by the broadband provider. 
Moreover, broadband providers have the incentive to deliberately give their own services 
favored treatment and withhold that from competitors.  Internet provision is not the main business 
of broadband providers serving residential customers.  The main business of telecommunications 
carriers is phone service; the main business of cable television companies is providing cable 
television service.  Both types of companies provide Internet service, but it is neither their primary 
service nor their main revenue line.  Thus, it is natural for these companies to have conflicts 
between their traditional services and substitutes to them that are provided over the Internet.  Voice 
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is produced over the Internet but competes with traditional telephone 
service.  VoIP of an independent provider, such as Vonage, competes with branded VoIP of a 
cable company.  In both cases, the incentives to discriminate against the rival’s service both in 
price and in a non-price manner are obvious.11 There are similar concerns with cable television and 
video services provided by telecommunications companies.  There is an emerging market for video 
downloads over the Internet that directly competes with the incumbents’ broadcast channels over 
cable. 
Although active sabotage of a competitor’s service is obviously an illegal form of 
discrimination, broadband providers do not need to use this tactic.  For example, to discriminate 
effectively against a VoIP competitor, it would be sufficient for the access provider to set a high fee 
for access to the “premium lane,” which will effectively block profitable operation by the competitor 
whose operation is relegated to the “standard lane” the speed of which has been degraded by 
allocation of bandwidth to the fast lane.  We should guard against the possibility that “network 
management” may be used to discriminate against rivals’ services.  This underlines the necessity 
for transparency in network management. 
                                                            
11  For a more detailed analysis, see Economides (1998). 
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2.4 Termination Fees and Paid Prioritization Will Tilt the Competitive Playing 
Field, Raising Barriers for New Entrants 
If broadband providers are able to engage in paid prioritization schemes, the “winner” in the 
market would be the application or content providers that are able to afford to pay for prioritization.  
In markets with network effects, there can be “lock-in,”12  that is, a firm with significant market share 
can preserve its dominance for a long time, with adverse consequences to innovation.  Lock-in is 
more likely when the costs of entry are high.  Here, discrimination by the broadband providers 
would increase the costs of entry of innovators and make it more likely that (i) less innovation 
would occur; and (ii) the “winner” chosen by the broadband providers would remain in place for the 
long term. 
Moreover, there are technology-specific investments that networks may make that will 
perpetuate an old winner regardless of its current advantages.  For example, Real was the first 
commercial entity to create a compression technology that allowed for streaming audio and video 
in the dial-up world.  Real was the market leader even in the infancy of the broadband transition.  If 
broadband providers had selected Real as the prioritized media player at that time, they would 
have optimized their networks for that service.  Other technology would also have been customized 
to Real, and, as a result, investment in developing better compression technologies and alternative 
video systems, such as Bit Torrent and YouTube, may not have been developed.13 
Furthermore, once successful innovations have occurred at the edge of the network, a 
network operator with market power has an incentive to exercise its control of the network to raise 
its access price to innovators who have succeeded.  This significantly dampens the ex ante 
incentives for such innovations to occur.  Network neutrality preserves the innovation incentives at 
the edge of the network and prevents ex-post opportunism by network operators.  
In the extreme, a broadband provider can use identity-based discrimination (based on 
source or ownership of content) and exclusive contracts to identify a “winner” on the content side 
and then charge them for the privilege.  For example, an access network may offer the following 
contract to search providers.  Only one search provider will receive prioritization, and all other 
search providers must use the slow lane.  If relative speeds matter to customers, it can make the 
prioritized search provider’s service more valuable and more widely chosen than its rivals’ service 
even if that was not the case before the introduction of the price discrimination scheme.  
Essentially, this price discrimination scheme picks the winner in search in exchange for the price of 
the exclusive prioritization.  
This contract would create a number of distortions in the market for search, including: (1) 
the winner will be the one with the deepest pockets and not necessarily the one that is best in 
search; (2) it distorts the innovation race -- new companies without deep pockets are eliminated 
from the competition; (3) it raises the cost of innovation and diminishes innovation overall; (4) in the 
presence of network effects and lock-in it can result in these suboptimal choices persisting in the 
long run.  This price discrimination scheme can lead to a suboptimal choice in any year it is in 
effect.  In the presence of network effects and lock-in, even if the choice were optimal in the year it 
                                                            
12  See Farrell and Saloner (1985). 
13  See Riley and Topolski (2009), pages 6-7. 
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was made, that choice can be locked-in and persist in the long run.  For example, if such a scheme 
was in effect in 2000, it would have chosen Microsoft or Yahoo as winners in search and due to 
lock-in Google might never have succeeded.  
2.5 Termination Fees and Paid Prioritization Threaten to Create a “Prisoner’s 
Dilemma” where Consumers as well as Application and Content Providers 
Are All Worse Off 
Suppose that a broadband provider offers prioritization guaranteeing that, for example,  
video content providers14 in the priority lane arrives a few seconds before all other providers in the 
standard lane.  This can be done just by slowing the standard lane down by a few seconds without 
making any data move faster.  Given the prospect of losing almost all their customers if they stay in 
the slow lane, every video content provider that can afford it will choose to pay to be in the “priority 
lane.”  What is the result?  The video content of the remaining active firms would all arrive at the 
same speed as before, competition would remain the same among the firms that can afford the 
payment, but all these firms would pay a higher price to broadband providers.  The companies that 
cannot afford to pay die.  Both surviving and foreclosed firms are worse off.  Consumers are worse 
off as they now have fewer choices on the content and applications side of the market.  Allocative 
efficiency is reduced since content providers now pay additional fees over and above the cost-
based fees that they already pay for connection to the Internet.  
In this scenario, the broadband provider, in the absence of limits on discrimination towards 
content and applications providers, has forced content providers to play a prisoners’ dilemma game 
and they all lose as a result.  Society loses in terms of innovation that will not occur because only 
firms with deep pockets can survive; in terms of the reduced variety of services due to the 
foreclosed firms that have disappeared; and in terms of consumers’ surplus lost because of the 
disappearance of some content providers.  Moreover, this price discrimination scheme can be 
forced by the broadband providers on each subsector of content and applications providers, 
multiplying the adverse effects on competition, innovation, and availability of varieties in every area 
of content and applications. 
The consequences of such fees can be even worse for society when discrimination is 
more extreme.  For example, the broadband provider can offer prioritization that guarantees the 
video content in the priority lane arrives ten seconds before video content in the standard lane, but 
this time only provides prioritization to a single video content provider.  This will guarantee that 
other providers are foreclosed from this access network.  Such a price discrimination scheme 
makes the prisoners’ dilemma even more extreme.  Each video content provider will try as hard as 
possible (and will offer very large sums of money) to be the one picked for the priority lane.  
Moreover, broadband providers will have an incentive to write such contracts as the willingness to 
pay of the winning content provider increases when it faces less competition.  
 
 
                                                            
14  One could of course offer a similar example using search information, VoIP, interactive gaming, and so on. 
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2.6 Paid Prioritization Schemes Would Create Perverse Incentives to Degrade 
Service Quality or Avoid Network Upgrades 
For competing content services, the relative speed of information arrival is often crucial to 
users regardless of absolute speed.  In these cases, content providers are willing to pay more for a 
faster relative speed to ensure an advantage on the competition.  If unrestrained, the broadband 
provider has an incentive to create artificial congestion in the “slow lane” that will make consumers 
value more the prioritized information packets (in the “fast lane”) and value less the ones that did 
not pay for prioritized service (in the “slow lane”).  This is not predicated on the existence of 
congestion before the introduction of the prioritization scheme.  Even without any ex ante 
congestion, a broadband provider with market power has incentives to create congestion in the 
“slow lane” and artificially create a speed difference in the arrival of prioritized and non-prioritized 
packets.  Therefore instead of solving a congestion problem, the introduction of prioritization is 
likely to create one, resulting in allocative inefficiency.  
The fact that businesses may intentionally take costly measures to degrade the value of a 
product in order to implement price discrimination is well understood in the economics literature.  
See for example, Deneckere and McAfee (1996), who develop this theory in detail.15 The basic 
understanding dates back at least to the early nineteenth century in France (see Jules Dupuit 
(1844)).16 In the telecommunications industry itself, telephone companies were originally reluctant 
to promote DSL because it cannibalized existing, lucrative high-end T1 services. 
Choi and Kim (2008), Lee and Wu (2009), and Peha (2007), discuss the introduction of 
price discrimination toward content providers and note that prioritization reduces their incentive to 
invest in network capacity.  Content and application providers will only be willing to pay for 
prioritization if there is a meaningful difference between the “fast” and “slow” lanes.  Thus, 
broadband providers would have an incentive to avoid investing in capacity and solving congestion 
problems.  I will discuss this in detail in the network investment section. 
2.7 The Lack of Competition in the Last-Mile Dramatically Heightens These 
Worries 
These potential harms are particularly worrisome in light of the fact that residential users 
have limited choices of broadband networks.  The lack of competition concentrates market power 
for the residential access broadband networks.  In turn, market forces are inapt to check harmful 
behavior by broadband providers, as consumers cannot easily and without facing costs switch to 
other providers.  As I explain below, market power of last mile access broadband networks arises 
not only from the small number of available choices at a consumer’s location but also because of 
                                                            
15  Also see Mussa and Rosen (1984), Maskin and Riley (1984), Tirole (1988, pp. 149 – 150), and Varian (1985) and 
the references therein. 
16  Jules Dupuit (1844) wrote about implementation of price discrimination in French railways:  “It is not because of the 
few thousand francs which would have to be spent to put a roof over the third-class carriages or to upholster the third-
class seats that some company or other has open carriages with wooden benches.  What the company is trying to do 
is to prevent the passengers who can pay the second class fare from traveling third class; it hits the poor, not because 
it wants to hurt them, but to frighten the rich.  And it is again for the same reason that the companies, having proved 
almost cruel to the third-class passengers and mean to the second-class ones, become lavish in dealing with first-class 
passengers.  Having refused the poor what is necessary, they give the rich what is superfluous.” 
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the existence of significant switching costs, competition-lowering effects of bundling Internet 
service with other services, and new uncertainty and information costs to consumers should 
discrimination be introduced.  
Most U.S. households face a choice of at most two competing broadband providers and 
broadband pricing is determined by a duopoly between a cable and a phone company.17 Several 
sources confirm this.  Turner (2009b) estimates that together incumbent phone and cable 
companies control 95% of the broadband market considering all available technologies.  A report 
by the Congressional Research Service describes the broadband market as a “duopoly for the 
foreseeable future.”18 GAO (2006) finds that all but two percent of broadband users subscribe to 
either DSL or cable modem access.  Pew (2009) finds that on average households face a choice of 
only 2.5 providers, including resellers.19  
Due to the limitations of satellite and mobile technologies, DSL and cable modem access 
still represent the vast majority of broadband connections.  Widely deployed, third-generation, high-
speed mobile Internet services are still not frequently adopted because high prices and their slower 
speeds relative to fixed broadband services limit their usefulness as a substitute for wireline 
service.20 Satellite access also suffers from high prices and slow speeds as well but also is 
hampered by high latency which limits its use primarily to areas with no other available options.21  
The wireless market – which at present provides only a complement and not a substitute 
for wireline broadband service – is also highly concentrated.  Four carriers control over 90% of the 
market, with Verizon and AT&T, two of the incumbent telephone companies, comprising over 
60%.22 Turner (2009b) estimates that incumbent telephone companies control over 80% of the 
high-speed mobile Internet access market.  
The market power of access networks is enhanced by (i) the existence of switching costs; 
(ii) bundling of broadband Internet with other services; and (iii) information costs and uncertainty to 
                                                            
17  An economic method for summarizing the degree of competition between duopolists is the elasticity of firm-specific 
demand.  This measures the percentage decrease in the firm’s sales when it increases its price unilaterally by one 
percent.  If the market were highly competitive, such a unilateral price increase would result in a huge drop in sales (in 
a fully competitive market the firm increasing its price would lose all its sales and the elasticity would be negative 
infinity).  Studies of the firm-specific price elasticities of demand for cable modem and DSL service in the U.S. place 
them between -0.59 and -1.465.  Rappoport, et al. (2003) estimate the price elasticity of demand for cable modem 
access as -0.59 for DSL access as -1.465.  Crandall, Sidak, and Singer (2002) estimate the price elasticity of demand 
for cable modem access as -1.22 and for DSL access as -1.18.  That is, a broadband provider can raise price by one 
percent (while the rival keeps its price fixed) and its sales will drop by 0.59 to 1.465 percent.  Since broadband 
providers face a relatively inelastic firm-specific demand, they have significant market power.  
18  Congressional Research Service (2006), page 17. 
19  Computations based on data from pages 23 and 24 of Pew (2009) excluding respondents who “don’t know” and 
assuming four providers for those who face four or more providers.  23% of households have the choice of only one 
provider, 24% two providers, 33% three providers, and 20% four or more providers. 
20  See Turner (2009b). 
21  See GAO (2006), page 8. 
22 See Josh Koshman, New sell needed for cellphone companies, New York Post (Dec. 27, 2009) available at 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/new_sell_needed_for_cellphone_companies_QUyAmcswYWheqvK63oRX2L. 
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consumers should discrimination be introduced.  Residential customers contemplating changing 
broadband providers have to change the equipment they use at home and the physical network 
access at their location.  These switching costs are significant and create market frictions that 
contribute to the ability of networks to keep customers.  Since customers will not respond by 
changing providers to a lower price from a rival, broadband providers face a less elastic firm-
specific demand and have stronger incentives not to cut prices, leading to market power and higher 
equilibrium prices of residential broadband Internet access.  
In addition, the best pricing for residential broadband Internet access is often available only 
when the customer buys a bundle of services from the same provider.  For example, a cable 
television company may provide a lower price for broadband Internet access if the customer also 
subscribes to its television service.  This creates an additional impediment for residential users who 
are contemplating changing broadband providers.  If a customer does so, his remaining services 
with the old provider may become more expensive.  As a result, a customer will not change 
Internet service providers even if a rival offers cheaper broadband service unless the rival also 
offers the bundled service and the customer likes it equally well.23 Thus, bundling of Internet 
service lowers the firm-specific elasticity of demand and adds to the market power of last mile 
access networks. 
Moreover, if discrimination toward the content side of the market is introduced, consumers 
will generally not know why some information and services come to them with delay or not at all.  
New providers may never reach consumers, and consumers will never know what they missed.  
Delays in services of known providers may be attributed to them rather than to the network.  Thus, 
discrimination can create significant uncertainty and information costs to consumers.  The fact that 
the quality of the network services is opaque to consumers under discrimination, confers additional 
market power to access networks. 
Consistent with economic theory and these findings, the result of the broadband providers’ 
market power is lower penetration and higher prices for broadband service in the U.S. relative to 
comparable countries.  An OECD study and other sources report low broadband Internet 
penetration in the U.S. and a deteriorating U.S. penetration international ranking.  The OECD 
reports that the United States is ranked fifteenth in market penetration (broadband connections per 
100 inhabitants) among OECD members.24 The United States ranks below a number of European 
countries as well as Korea and Canada.  Additionally, the difference between the United States 
and leading countries is substantial.  The top five countries in broadband penetration have on 
average 24% higher penetration than the United States, and the top ten countries have on average 
20% higher penetration than the United States.  The United States would have to increase its 
                                                            
23  For example, telephone companies typically do not provide the assortment of television channels offered by cable 
television companies making it costly for a household to switch from cable modem to DSL service if he/she also values 
television services. 
24  See OECD broadband web site at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,3343,en_2649_34225_38690102_1_1_1_1,00.html.  Additionally, Turner (2009b) 
contains International Telecommunications Union (ITU) data showing US’s international ranking dropping from fifth in 
2000 to twenty second in 2007.  The low penetration ranking of the U.S. is corroborated by other studies.  For 
example, using data on OECD countries from several sources and employing multiple metrics, a study by the Berkman 
Center for Internet & Society (Berkman Center (2009)) finds that among thirty OECD countries, the U.S. is in the third 
quintile of fixed broadband penetration and third quintile in average prices for all but the slowest broadband speeds. 
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broadband penetration by 20% to reach the average of the top 10 countries, and by 24% to reach 
the average of the top five.  Table 1 shows broadband penetration per 100 inhabitants in OECD 
countries and Figure 1 depicts this information.  The broadband penetration ranking of the U.S. has 
deteriorated from third in 2001 to twelfth in 2005 to fifteenth in 2006-2008.  Table 2 lists US 
rankings from 2001-2009, and Figure 2 depicts this information. 
It is important to note here that since the last-mile access networks to residential users are 
serially-related to (that is, not substitutable with) the Internet backbone, competitive forces in the 
backbone cannot eliminate the market power and resulting market distortions in the last-mile 
access networks to residential consumers.  Therefore, market power in the last-mile is not 
eliminated and affects the whole Internet. 
2.8 Multi-sidedness on the Internet Does Not Imply Positive Charges on All 
Sides 
As a communications network, the Internet consists of over a billion devices (nodes) 
connected through links and routers.  In many ways, it is a billion-sided network.  Any user has the 
possibility of setting up content and engaging in a variety of downloads or transmissions such as 
email, video, pictures, and postings.  By grouping users according to their most common activity on 
the network, one can attempt to reduce the number of “sides” of the network.  So, residential users 
can be thought of as net consumers of information while search engine companies can be thought 
of as net producers of refined or structured information.  In this way, some describe the Internet as 
two-sided.  However, if the object of interest were news commentary, there is no easy division 
between the producers and consumers.  Many nodes are both consumers and producers.  This is 
in sharp contrast with other two-sided networks where the roles are strictly defined.  For example, 
payment systems networks, such as the card networks of MasterCard, Visa and American Express 
function as two-sided networks.  One side of the market (card holders) is quite distinct from the 
other (merchants).  On the Internet, the blurring of the identification with a specific side of the 
network cautions against using received wisdom from two-sided networks and blindly applying it to 
the Internet.  
Even if the Internet is viewed as a two-sided network, there is no immediate implication 
that a broadband provider should charge both sides of the market.  For example, in payment 
systems, American Express has no-fee cards that give 2% back to users on purchases while 
American Express collects a 3% fee from merchants.  Even though it is able to charge both sides 
of the market, American Express, chooses to charge one side and subsidize the other.  Thus, the 
private incentives in some two-sided networks do not necessarily imply positive charges on both 
sides of the market.25 
3. The Danger of New Tolls Far Outweighs the Potential Upside 
I have thus far considered the possible harms of broadband providers deviating from the 
status quo by introducing new tolls on the Internet.  That is not the only relevant factor in 
considering these new tolls, of course.  In order to account fully for whether such a deviation would 
be socially beneficial, we must also consider the supposed benefits. 
                                                            
25  See also the discussion on the divergence of private and public incentives in section 2.1. 
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Broadband providers typically suggest two particular benefits.  First, they argue that 
prioritization will be good for end-users, allowing the development of innovative new services.  
Many of the concerns I raise above can also be applied to prioritization generally, regardless of 
whether it is provided for a fee; for example, if prioritization is used to essentially “pick winners” in 
the market, that will impede innovation online, even if there is no charge to content or application 
providers.  Within the scope of this paper, a critical point is that we must disentangle two different 
issues here – the technical merits of prioritization and its benefits to users, versus the merits of 
charging third-parties for prioritization.  As I have argued above, the introduction of new tolls on the 
Internet -- and a shift away from last-mile broadband providers simply charging their end-user 
customers -- introduces particular concerns. 
Broadband providers also argue that if they are not allowed to charge direct fees as well as 
to discriminate towards the content side of the market, they will invest less in their networks.  They 
argue that under network neutrality they do not have sufficient funds to invest in the network.  
Sometimes this argument is augmented by assuming congestion in the local access network.  
However, I conclude that the imposition of new tolls by broadband providers is unlikely to result in 
higher network investment and may even decrease investment for the following reasons identified 
in academic economic research. 
4. If Additional Investment in Capacity by a Broadband Provider is 
Necessary, There is No Need for Special or Additional Fees Charged 
to Content and Application Providers 
Here, too, we must disentangle two separate issues – whether additional investment is 
beneficial, and whether it must be paid for through content and application providers.  
Broadband providers can of course charge users.  Also, as discussed above, the present 
transit market works well.  If a particular broadband provider believes that it deserves more 
revenue because it has customers that bring great value to the Internet, it can negotiate lower 
transit rates with backbone providers, effectively decreasing its operational costs.  If in fact an ISP 
brings great value and this is recognized by the backbones providers offering lower prices, they, in 
turn, can adjust fees to all other ISPs, including those whom the content and applications providers 
use to connect to the Internet.  In making these decisions, all parties have the appropriate 
incentives to evaluate the value added by each participant.  
Thus, a market already exists which can appropriately and effectively respond to any 
special value that broadband providers bring to the Internet.  Additional or special fees are 
unnecessary to align properly benefits with returns.  In fact, the imposition of fees by a broadband 
provider to content and applications is an attempt to bypass the existing and well-functioning 
market for transport. 
4.1 Higher Revenue to Broadband Providers as a Result of the Imposing 
Charges to Content and Application Providers May Not Increase Investment 
in the Network 
If limits on discrimination by broadband providers are abolished, it is unclear that the 
additional profits the broadband providers would earn from content and application providers would 
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be used to finance investments in the network.  The networks are profit-maximizing firms, and may 
simply pass on the additional profits to shareholders.26 Since the broadband providers have 
significant market power, additional profits from violations of network neutrality are rewards of their 
monopoly power and not rewards for new investment or higher quality.  Compared to perfectly 
competitive firms, networks with market power generally have incentives to invest less and sell less 
output.  Additional profits from exercising market power will tend to benefit shareholders rather than 
being devoted to expanding output.  Further, if upgrading the network was essential for future 
profitability, the last-mile networks have ample access to credit markets to fund the investments. 
4.2 In Fact, Paid Prioritization May Create Incentives to Reduce Network 
Investments  
As discussed above, if broadband providers are allowed to charge content providers for 
prioritized access, they will have incentives to reduce investments in their networks.  The more 
congested the network, the greater value prioritized access providers.  This allows the broadband 
providers to charge content providers higher prices for priority access and make higher profits.  
Without congestion, broadband providers would be unable to charge higher prices for the priority 
service.  Thus, allowing broadband providers to charge content providers for prioritized access 
creates an incentive to invest less in capacity and distorts incentives to upgrade the network (see 
Choi and Kim (2008), Peha (2007), and Lee and Wu (2009)).  There is a large theoretical and 
empirical literature that describes the incentives of a monopolist to degrade low-end products to 
make sure consumers buy more expensive, high-end products.27 As monopolists, broadband 
providers have these same incentives and may want to create differentiation between their high- 
and low-end services by degrading the speed of their low-end service.  This may result in 
maintaining congestion by not investing in new capacity or even artificially introducing congestion 
by slowing down the low-end service even when sufficient capacity is available. 
4.3 Paid Prioritization Misaligns the Incentives to Invest in the Network.  
Suppose there is a need for additional investment because of demand for priority delivery 
by some users.  Some users may be willing to pay more to receive content faster (say by 
“streaming” a movie) while other users prefer downloading slowly (say by using buffer storage) and 
paying less.  Economic theory says that in order to align properly market incentives those 
consumers who demand prioritization should pay and those who do not should not pay.  This is 
easily and directly accomplished by broadband providers charging different prices to different end 
users based on their desired speed of service.  On the other hand, imposing fees on content and 
application providers would require each of them to determine which customers desire a higher 
speed of service and which do not, imposing a significant burden on these providers given that 
they are much less informed about users’ desires than users themselves.  Additionally imposing 
fees on these providers for all its transmissions irrespective of the distribution of its customers in 
terms of desire for speed will seriously misalign the market incentives. 
                                                            
26  See Lee and Wu, 2009, among others. 
27  Also see cites in section 2.6. 
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4.4 Empirical Evidence Suggests that Broadband Providers Invest More Under 
Network Neutrality and Also Tend to Invest More When Regulations Promote 
Competition 
There is evidence that broadband providers have invested large sums in upgrading their 
networks under the current regime in which they do not charge content and application providers.  
For example, Turner (2009a) shows that AT&T’s overall gross investments in its network increased 
by $1.8 billion from 2007 to 2008 when it had consented to operate a neutral network under 
conditions imposed by the FCC in its acquisition of BellSouth.  As a percentage of wire line 
revenues, wire line investments grew from 13.5% to 20.2%.  Moreover, Turner (2009a) shows that 
capital investment in telecommunications was greatest during the regulatory period under the 1996 
Telecom Act and then fell after the dismantling of the Act, suggesting that networks may invest 
more when regulation leads to increased competition. 
4.5 Discrimination Diverts Money Away From Network Investment 
Charging differential prices to content providers for access to consumers is costly for the 
broadband providers as they must carefully monitor and account for the traffic over their network.  
This would divert resources away from investments in network upgrades and toward systems 
necessary to implement price discrimination (see Peha, 2007). 
4.6 Setting Aside All of the Above and Assuming Additional Charges Did 
Increase Network Investment, The Charges Could Still Result in a Net Social 
Welfare Decrease 
Network investment is one of a number of variables that economists consider in deriving 
consumers’ welfare, firm profits, and total societal welfare.  Identical levels of network investment 
can result in different levels of consumers’ welfare and firm profits depending on prices and 
participation levels of users and content providers.  The two-sided nature of the Internet implies 
that society can benefit from maximizing network effects (positive feedback effects) that flow from 
content providers to users and vice versa.  Network investment can facilitate this interaction and 
create a virtuous cycle in which both sides reap the benefit of network effects as long as prices 
remain close to costs and are non-discriminatory.  However, network investment combined with 
fees and price discrimination on the provider side and prices well above costs on the user side will 
reduce investment in and provision of content and applications as well as the penetration and use 
of the Internet, thereby significantly reducing the network effects that drive the Internet as well as 
the societal benefit from the Internet.  Maximizing overall societal welfare should be the goal of 
policy, and it should not be sacrificed simply to find extra revenue for additional network 
investment. 
Conclusion 
The FCC’s proposed codification of the tradition of non-discrimination towards content 
providers on the Internet will be highly beneficial.  The tremendous success of the Internet and its 
very significant contribution to economic growth has come in part from harnessing network effects.  
Network effects arise as more content and applications make a user’s connection more valuable 
and vice versa.  The ability to create and easily disseminate content on the Internet has been 
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supported by its tradition of non-discrimination.  The success of the Internet and the abundance of 
network effects it harnesses are based the ability of individuals and companies at the edge of the 
network to innovate without asking permission from network operators.  
The imposition of new charges on application and content providers by broadband 
providers would diminish the incentive to innovate, reduce the amount of innovation, reduce the 
amount of content and applications available, and make access to some content difficult.  All these 
effects will individually and in combination reduce the societal benefits from the Internet. 
In evaluating policy on the Internet, our goal should be maximization of societal benefits, 
which to a significant extent accrue from network effects.  While investment in network 
infrastructure is desirable, it should not be the sole goal of policy.  Policy that encourages network 
infrastructure investment but discourages innovation and the creation of network effects is 
undesirable.  Additionally, I present a number of arguments that show that introducing 
discrimination is not necessary for expanding network investment, and under some conditions will 
reduce it.  
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TABLE 1 
Rank Country Internet Penetration 
1 Netherlands 38.1 
2 Denmark 37.0 
3 Norway 34.5 
4 Switzerland 33.8 
5 Korea 32.8 
6 Iceland 32.8 
7 Sweden 31.6 
8 Luxembourg 31.3 
9 Finland 29.7 
10 Canada 29.7 
11 Germany 29.3 
12 France 29.1 
13 United Kingdom 28.9 
14 Belgium 28.4 
15 United States 26.7 
16 Australia 24.9 
17 Japan 24.2 
18 New Zealand 22.8 
19 Austria 21.8 
20 Ireland 21.4 
21 Spain 20.8 
22 Italy 19.8 
23 Czech Republic 18.1 
24 Portugal 17.0 
25 Greece 17.0 
26 Hungary 16.8 
27 Slovak Republic 12.6 
28 Poland 11.3 
29 Turkey 8.7 
30 Mexico 8.4 
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FIGURE 1 
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TABLE 2 
International Penetration Ranking of the U.S. in years 2001-2009 based on OECD data from 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband. 
Year U.S. Rank out of the 30 
OECD countries 
2001, Q2 3 
2002, Q2 6 
2003, Q2 10 
2004, Q2 12 
2005, Q2 12 
2006, Q2 13 
2007, Q2 15 
2008, Q2 15 
2009, Q2 15 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Deterioration of U.S. Broadband Ranking in OECD 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
U.S. Broadband Rank
Rank
